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ALL OR NOTHING: WHY THE
SUPREME COURT SAS MANDATE DOES
NOT ELIMINATE THE SHAW SAFE
HARBOR
MATT JOHNSON, MICHAEL LAVINE, DANIEL KAZHDAN PH.D., LISA
FURBY, DAVID ANDERSON
INTRODUCTION
The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) has become one of the
busiest patent dockets in the United States. It is on track to receive over
1,500 requests for America Invents Act (“AIA”) trials in the fiscal year
2018.1 Most of these requests are for inter partes review (“IPR”), through
which petitioners can challenge an issued patent based on prior-art “patents
or printed publications.”2 While wildly popular as a mechanism for
reviewing issued patents, the PTAB has not lived up to all stakeholders’
expectations as a method for one-stop resolution of patent validity.
When IPRs were enacted, Congress added an “estoppel” provision:
once the PTAB upholds a patent in a Final Written Decision, the petitioner,
its privies, and its real parties-in-interest are estopped from challenging the
patent “on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have
raised during that inter partes review.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(e). Some felt that
once the Patent Office institutes an IPR, the IPR should, therefore, operate
as a complete substitute for district court challenges to patent claims under
35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 based on patents and printed publications. For
example, when the Senate was discussing the AIA, Senator Grassley
expressed his hope that instituted IPRs would “completely substitute for at
least the patents-and-printed-publications portion of the civil litigation.”3

1. Trial Statistics IPR, PGR, CBM, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (July 2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics_20180731.pdf.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).
3. 157 CONG. REC. S1360-94 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of S. Grassley).
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Federal Circuit Judge Newman has likewise described IPRs as a “complete
alternative and complete substitution” for district-court litigation.4
But that has not been the case. If the Patent Office refused to institute
an IPR on some grounds, as it used to do routinely, courts would allow
petitioners to raise those non-instituted grounds in later district-court
litigation.5 Thus, patent owners and petitioners would frequently have to
litigate the same patent and the same claims both before the PTAB and
before a district court. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in SAS
Institute Inc. v. Iancu will reduce such fractured litigations,6 but as this
article shows, SAS will not eliminate them entirely.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes the Patent
Office’s pre-SAS approach of partially instituting IPRs. When the Patent
Office only instituted review on some grounds, courts (most notably the
Federal Circuit in Shaw Industries v. Automated Creel Systems) generally
allowed petitioners to re-raise those non-instituted grounds in later districtcourt proceedings. Part II explains that the Supreme Court’s SAS decision
and its progeny largely prevents partial institutions, and therefore, many of
the thorny estoppel issues will no longer arise. However, as Part III notes,
the Patent Office continues to only partially institute review when multiple
grounds are raised in multiple petitions. Thus, estoppel questions will still
arise. The Conclusion addresses potential strategy implications for
petitioners and patent owners.
THE PATENT OFFICE’S APPROACH PRE-SAS ALLOWED FOR PARTIAL
INSTITUTION OF A SINGLE PETITION
Prior to SAS, the Patent Office regulations permitted the PTAB to
simplify cases by instituting trial on only “some of the challenged claims”
and only “some of the grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”7
The Patent Office’s approach in SAS is illustrative. SAS filed an IPR
petition seeking review of one of ComplementSoft’s patents. The petition

4. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Newman, J.,
concurring in part).
5. See generally Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir.
2016); see also Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2017); HP
Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC, 817 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553 (D. Del. 2016); Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics,
Inc., No. 3:12-cv-05501-SI, 2017 WL 235048, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017); and Finjan, Inc. v. Blue
Coat Sys., 283 F. Supp. 3d 839, 856–57 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
6. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
7. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2012).
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challenged all 16 claims of the patent.8 The Board instituted IPR for only
claims 1 and 3-10, denying institution for claims 2 and 11-16.9 In its final
written decision, the Board found claims 1, 3 and 5-10 unpatentable but did
not address any of the claims that were not instituted.10 SAS appealed,
arguing that the Board was required to review all of the claims identified in
SAS’s petition and that it was unfair that the validity of the uninstituted
claims would have to be relitigated in district court.11 The Federal Circuit
rejected this argument.12
The Patent Office’s pre-SAS partial-institution approach raised a
difficult estoppel question. As petitioners routinely argued, it would seem
to be unfair to estop a petitioner from re-raising, to a district court, grounds
that the Patent Office refused to consider in the first place. The Federal
Circuit agreed. In Shaw, it held that a petitioner is not estopped from
raising non-instituted grounds in a district court proceeding if the Patent
Office refused to institute on those grounds in an IPR. According to Shaw,
“[t]he IPR does not begin until it is instituted,” and the very fact that the
Patent Office denies institution is evidence that the petitioner “did not
raise—nor could it have reasonably raised—the [non-instituted] ground
during the IPR.”13
THE PATENT OFFICE CAN NO LONGER PARTIALLY INSTITUTE IPR
PETITIONS
In SAS, the Supreme Court rejected the Patent Office’s practice of
instituting IPR petitions on only some of the claims challenged in the
petition. The Court marshaled a number of arguments. First, “in an inter
partes review the petitioner is master of its complaint and normally entitled
to judgment on all of the claims it raises.”14 Second, the Court emphasized
the statutory command that the Board address “‘any patent claim

8. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, IPR2013-00226, Paper 1 at 11–12 (P.T.A.B., Mar.
29, 2013).
9. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, IPR2013-00226, Paper 9 at 22 (P.T.A.B., Aug. 12,
2013).
10. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, IPR2013-00226, Paper 38 (P.T.A.B., Aug. 6, 2014).
11. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), reh’g denied, 842
F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
12. Id.
13. Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
accord HP Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC, 817 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he noninstituted
grounds do not become a part of the IPR . . . [T]he noninstituted grounds were not raised and, as review
was denied, could not be raised in the IPR.”).
14. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018).
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challenged by the petitioner.’”15 According to the majority, this required a
decision on the patentability of “every claim.”16 The Supreme Court’s SAS
decision is thus clear that, when a trial is instituted, every claim requested
by the petitioner must be included and addressed in the Final Written
Decision.
SAS does not explicitly resolve whether “all grounds” presented in a
petition must also be included in an instituted trial. On the one hand, the
quoted statutory provision about “any patent claim” does not address
multiple grounds. On the other hand, the master-of-its-complaint rationale
would seem to apply to grounds as well as to claims. Shortly after SAS, the
Patent Office decided that, if it instituted an IPR, it would do so not only on
all of the challenged claims, as is required by SAS, but also “on all
challenges raised in the petition.”17 The Federal Circuit has since ratified
that stance, explaining that “equal treatment of claims and grounds for
institution purposes has pervasive support in SAS.”18
THE PTAB’S POST-SAS TREATMENT OF MULTIPLE PETITIONS
CHALLENGING A COMMON PATENT
SAS and its progeny partially solve the estoppel problem addressed by
Shaw. The Patent Office can no longer institute only some petitioned-for
grounds if all the grounds are raised in a single petition. It has a binary
choice of either instituting all grounds or none. But what if multiple
grounds are raised in multiple petitions, and the Patent Office institutes
some petitions but not others—what this article will call “mixed-institution
cases”? In those cases, the PTAB might not resolve all §§ 102 and 103
disputes. Under Shaw, it might be that the grounds raised in such noninstituted petitions could be raised in subsequent district-court litigations,
without any potential estoppel. If so, patent owners and petitioners would
still face the possibility of having to litigate the validity of a patent in
multiple fora. This is not an edge-case issue; one-third of all patents

15. Id. at 1354 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)).
16. Id.
17. See Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings, USPTO, (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/guidance_on_the_impact_of_sas_on_aia_trial_pro
ceedings_%20(april_26,_2018).pdf.
18. Adidas AG v. Nike, Inc., 894 F.3d 1256, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting PGS Geophysical AS
v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)) (citations omitted).
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challenged at the Patent Office are challenged via multiple petitions.19 The
authors expect that mixed institutions will arise regularly.
We have identified at least ten post-SAS mixed institution cases. A
selection of these occurrences is discussed in detail below. Interestingly,
none of the decisions note SAS as being a factor that is relevant to
instituting trial in one IPR but not the other. Moreover, we have identified
no instances in which the PTAB relied on SAS as a basis for instituting a
second IPR after already instituting a first IPR challenging the same patent.
The PTAB seemingly does not consider SAS to be a relevant factor across
multiple petitions challenging the same patent.
A SURVEY OF MIXED POST-SAS PTAB INSTITUTIONS ACROSS
PETITIONS CHALLENGING A COMMON PATENT
Several of the Patent Office’s denials in mixed-institution cases were
based on non-substantive, discretionary reasons.20 Most of these are based
on the PTAB’s view that petitioners should not be allowed to “strategically
stage their prior art and arguments in multiple petitions, using our decisions
as a roadmap, until a ground is found that results in the grant of review.”21
In its General Plastic Industries Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha
precedential decision, the PTAB enumerated seven relevant factors for
determining whether to deny institution based on another petition
challenging the same patent.22 Running afoul of the General Plastic timing

19. See David P. Ruschke et al., Chat with the Chief, An Analysis of Multiple Petitions in AIA
Trials, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Chat_with_the_Chief_Boardside_Chat_Multiple_P
etition_Study_20171024.pdf.
20. See e.g., BASF SE v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., IPR2018-00283, Paper No. 7 at 5
(P.T.A.B. June 11, 2018) (noting that “[i]nstitution of inter partes review is discretionary.”).
21. Gen. Plastic Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, 2017 WL 3917706,
at *7 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 6, 2017).
22. Id. at *7. The Board identified seven nonexclusive factors that bear on the issue of whether the
Board should invoke its discretion to deny institution of an IPR, based on a follow-on petition on the
same patent, under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a): (1) whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition
directed to the same claims of the same patent; (2) whether at the time of filing of the first petition the
petitioner knew of the prior art asserted in the second petition or should have known of it; (3) whether at
the time of filing of the second petition the petitioner already received the patent owner’s preliminary
response to the first petition or received the Board’s decision on whether to institute review in the first
petition; (4) the length of time that elapsed between the time the petitioner learned of the prior art
asserted in the second petition and the filing of the second petition; (5) whether the petitioner provides
adequate explanation for the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions directed to the same
claims of the same patent; (6) the finite resources of the Board; and (7) the requirement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 316(a)(11) to issue a final determination not later than one year after the date on which the Director
notices institution of review.
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factors can result in denial of an institution, even when the IPR is proper
and might otherwise be instituted.
Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. v. Oyster Optics, LLC, IPR2018-00070; 00257 is illustrative. In October 2017, a number of petitioners sought IPR
of Oyster’s patent (the -00070 matter). Five weeks later, those same
petitioners filed a second petition (the -00257 matter) that challenged the
same claims using different prior art. In its preliminary response, the patent
owner urged the Patent Office to exercise its discretion to deny institution
in the second matter. The Board analyzed the issue under the General
Plastic framework and concluded that the petitioners had “not provided an
adequate explanation for the time elapsed between the filing of the ‘0070
Petition and [the ‘00257] Petition.”23 The Board also observed that the
petitioners “ha[d] not explained why we should institute on another set of
grounds that rely on [overlapping secondary references].”24 These factors
convinced the Board to exercise its discretion and not institute.25
Other denials in mixed-institution cases were based on one petition
failing to meet the substantive threshold for an institution. For example, in

23. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc. v. Oyster Optics, LLC, IPR2018-00257, Paper No. 14 at 25
(P.T.A.B. June 4, 2018).
24. Id. at 26.
25. Additional examples of the Board exercising its discretionary authority under § 314(a) to
institute trial on a first petition but not a second challenging a common patent: compare Am. Honda
Motor Co., Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, IPR2018-00443 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 25, 2018) with Honda
Motor Co., Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, IPR2018-00348 (P.T.A.B. June 27, 2018) (joining
Honda to a preexisting IPR in -00443 but denying institution in -00348 largely based on General Plastic
Factor 3, because Honda had seen certain patent owner briefing prior to filing its -00348 petition);
compare Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, IPR2018-00442 (P.T.A.B. Apr.
25, 2018) with Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, No. IPR2018-00347
(P.T.A.B. June 27, 2018) (denying institution in the -00347 matter on similar facts as in -00348
discussed above); compare BASF SE v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., IPR2017-01948 (P.T.A.B.
Mar. 12, 2018) with BASF SE v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., IPR2017-00283 (P.T.A.B. June
11, 2018) (instituting trial in the -01948 matter while noting weaknesses in the petitioner’s position on
some dependent claims but denying institution in the -00283 matter that presented augmented grounds
to “patch holes” in the -01948 grounds for those dependent claims using references of which petitioner
was aware when filing the -01948 petition); compare Instrumentation Lab. Co. v. Hemosonics LLC,
IPR2017-00855 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 1, 2017) with Instrumentation Lab. Co. v. Hemosonics LLC, IPR201700264 (P.T.A.B. May 10, 2018) (instituting trial in the -00855 matter while noting weaknesses in the
petitioner’s position on some claims but denying institution in the -00264 matter based on General
Plastic Factor 3 because the follow-on petition used the -00855 Institution Decision as a roadmap for
tailoring
the
-00264
petition).
An example of the Board exercising its discretionary authority under § 325(d) to institute trial on a first
petition but not a second petition challenging the same patent is Align Tech., Inc. v. 3Shape A/S, No.
IPR2018-00198 (P.T.A.B. May 30, 2018) (instituting all grounds presented the -00197 matter but
exercising discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny the -00198 petition because arguments were
presented by the patent owner during prosecution regarding why a patent that is closely related to one of
petitioner’s secondary references does not disclose what petitioner alleged).
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RPX Corp. v. Spycurity LLC,26 RPX challenged the same claims of a patent
across two petitions, but the grounds presented across the two petitions
differed in their primary references.27 The PTAB instituted trial in the
IPR2018-00305 case but found the motivation to combine certain
references in the IPR2018-00304 matter unconvincing.28
These types of cases raise important estoppel questions. Can the
petitioners in Alcatel-Lucent raise the grounds that were in the noninstituted petition in a later district-court proceeding? Can RPX? Under
Shaw, arguably they could.
Because the General Plastic timing factors are known, and petition
timing is controlled by the petitioner, a petitioner theoretically could craft
its petitions in a way that one is likely to be denied. For example, the
petitioner could file a first petition containing the grounds that it wishes to
present to the PTAB. Three months later, the same petitioner could file a
second petition that contains the grounds it wishes to preserve for use in
district court. The Patent Office would likely deny the second petition
under General Plastic, potentially avoiding any estoppel. If the petitioner
were not estopped from raising the grounds from the second petition in
district court, the petitioner would have a workaround to the one-stopshopping that some see as a goal of the AIA.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in SAS will mitigate the number of
cases in which the same patent and claims are litigated in two different
26. RPX Corp. v. Spycurity LLC, IPR2018-00304 (P.T.A.B. June 22, 2018); RPX Corp. v.
Spycurity LLC, IPR2018-00305 (P.T.A.B. June 22, 2018).
27. Compare RPX Corp. v. Spycurity LLC, IPR2018-00304, Paper 2 at 2 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19,
2017) (citing Crawford) with RPX Corp. v. Spycurity LLC, IPR2018-00305 Paper 2 at 2 (P.T.A.B. Dec.
19, 2017) (citing Staples).
28. Additional examples of the Board exercising its discretionary authority to institute trial on a
first petition but not a second challenging a common patent for substantive reasons: compare GBT Inc.
v. Walletx Microelectronics LTD, IPR2018-00325 (P.T.A.B. July 3, 2018) with GBT Inc. v. Walletx
Microelectronics LTD, IPR2018-00326 (P.T.A.B. July 5, 2018) (instituting trial in -00326 but denying
institution in -00325 based on grounds relying on a different primary reference); compare ZTE (USA)
Inc. v. Fundamental Innovation Sys. Int’l LLC, IPR2018-00110 (P.T.A.B. May 8, 2018) with ZTE
(USA) Inc. v. Fundamental Innovation Sys. Int’l LLC, IPR2018-00111 (P.T.A.B. May 9, 2018)
(instituting trial in -00111 but denying institution in -00110 based on grounds relying on a different
primary reference); compare Sanofi Pasteur Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., IPR2018-00187 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 2018)
with Sanofi Pasteur Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., IPR2018-00188 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 2018) (instituting trial in 00187 but denying institution in -00188 based on grounds relying on a different primary reference);
compare Propel Orthodontics, LLC v. Orthoaccel Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00296 (P.T.A.B. June 11,
2018) with Propel Orthodontics, LLC v. Orthoaccel Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00398 (P.T.A.B. July 5,
2018) (instituting trial in -00296 but denying institution in -00398 based on grounds relying a different
primary reference).
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tribunals—generally the PTAB and a district court. The PTAB will have to
institute IPR on all the grounds raised in the petition, and its decision will
estop a losing petitioner from re-raising those same grounds in district
court. However, even after SAS, the Patent Office does not have to institute
every petition that challenges the same patent. Thus, there may still be noninstituted patent challenges—challenges that, under Shaw, a petitioner
could potentially later raise in district court. Creative petitioners may use
this loophole to their advantage. They could file a first petition with
arguments they want to raise to the PTAB; and later, the petitioner could
file a second petition based on art it wants to keep for district court
litigation. Because of the delay in filing, the Patent Office would likely
deny the second petition. A petitioner could thus provide itself with an
argument that those backup grounds fall within the Shaw’s safe harbor, in
which non-instituted grounds are not subject to estoppel, resulting in those
grounds being available in district court proceedings even if the PTAB
challenge proves unsuccessful.
Patent owners should be aware of such strategies. They might
affirmatively ask the Patent Office to issue a consistent ruling on all the
petitions—either institute all the petitions or deny all of them. Or they
might argue to the district court that allowing such machinations is
inequitable or otherwise improper. For example, they could argue that the
petitioner “reasonably could have raised” all the grounds raised in the
second petition in the first petition and, thus, the petitioner is estopped from
raising those grounds in the district court.
Shaw appears to remain good law that provides a viable, safe harbor
for non-instituted grounds. Although it will be implicated less frequently
post-SAS, PTAB practitioners should remain cognizant of Shaw’s operation
and be ready to capitalize or defend against it when circumstances dictate.

